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Abstract	  The	  philosopher	  Hans	  Kelsen	  is	  most	  famous	  for	  his	  “pure	  theory	   of	   law”,	   expounded	   in	   his	   book	   of	   that	   name.	   For	  most	  of	  his	  scholarly	  life,	  Kelsen	  argued	  that,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  pure	  theory,	  two	  norms	  that	  contradict	  one	  another	  within	  the	  same	  legal	  system	  breach	  the	  philosophical	  principle	  of	  exclusion	   of	   contradictions	   and	   therefore	   cannot	   both	   be	  valid	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  On	  some	  occasions	  he	  went	  further	  and	   argued	   that	   neither	   of	   two	   such	   norms	   can	   be	   valid.	  Famously,	  Kelsen	  changed	  to	  the	  opposite	  opinion	  later	  in	  life.	  Both	  Kelsen’s	  original	  and	  his	  ultimate	  positions	  on	  the	  principle	   of	   exclusion	   of	   contradictions	   shed	   light	   on	   an	  area	   of	   law	   that	   he	   never	   considered:	   general	   anti-­‐avoidance	   rules	   in	   income	   tax	   law,	   known	   as	   “GAARs”.	  GAARs	  are	  increasingly	  common	  in	  tax	  statutes.	  One	  cannot	  argue	  that	  GAARs	  give	  rise	  to	  what	  logicians	  call	   contradictions.	   Nevertheless,	   from	   a	   practical	   and	  substantive	   point	   of	   view	   the	   effect	   of	   a	   GAAR	   could	  loosely	  be	  described	  as	  akin	  to	  a	  contradiction	  of	  norms,	  in	  logical	   terms	   a	   breach	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   exclusion	   of	  contradictions.	   For	   instance,	   a	   GAAR	   may	   prevent	   a	  taxpayer	   from	   relying	   on	   a	   relieving	   provision	   in	   a	   tax	  statute,	  on	   the	  grounds	   that	  such	  reliance	  amounts	   in	   the	  circumstances	   to	   tax	   avoidance.	   For	   this	   kind	   of	   reason,	  people	  criticise	  GAARs	  because	  they	  are	  seen	  as	  breaching	  the	  principle	  of	  certainty,	  one	  of	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  General	   principles	   in	   Kelsen’s	   work	   shed	   light	   on	   the	  way	  in	  which	  GAARs	  operate	  and	  on	  the	  way	  in	  which	  they	  fit	  into	  the	  legal	  systems	  of	  which	  they	  form	  part.	  Although	  the	   effect	   of	   a	   GAAR	   has	   something	   in	   common	  with	   the	  effect	   of	   a	   breach	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   exclusion	   of	  contradictions,	   the	  unusual	  nature	  of	   tax	   law	   justifies	   the	  existence	  of	  GAARs.	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I. General	  anti-­‐avoidance	  rules	  General	   anti-­‐avoidance	   rules	   are	   found	   in	   increasing	  numbers	   of	   taxation	   statutes.	   They	   are	   often	   known	   as	  GAARs.	   Broadly	   speaking,	   GAARs	   impugn	   the	   fiscal	  planning	   of	   taxpayers	   who	   avoid	   taxes	   without	   breaking	  the	   law.	   GAARs	   address	   the	   case	   where	   taxpayers’	  transactions	   and	   investment	   structures	   comply	   with	   the	  law,	  and	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  law	  in	  question	  provide	  for	  tax	  to	  be	  levied	  in	  a	  favourable	  manner	  and	  at	  a	  favourable	  rate,	  but	   in	   effect	   the	   outcome	   is	   to	   avoid	   tax.	   In	   these	  circumstances,	   GAARs	   provide	   that	   the	   transactions	   and	  structures	   in	   question	   must	   be	   treated	   as	   void	   for	   tax	  purposes.	   The	   result	   is	   that	   tax	   applies	   not	   to	   the	   actual	  legal	  transactions	  that	  taxpayers	  have	  undertaken,	  that	  is,	  not	   to	   the	   avoidance	   transactions,	   but	   to	   notional	  transactions	   that	  are	  closer	   in	   legal	   form	  to	   the	  economic	  effect	  to	  what	  taxpayers	  have	  done.	  We	   ordinarily	   use	   the	   term	   “general	   anti-­‐avoidance	  rules”	   to	   refer	   to	   legislated	   rules,	   but	   some	   jurisdictions	  develop	   judge-­‐made	   rules	   that	   have	   a	   similar	   effect.	   A	  notable	   example	   is	   the	   substance-­‐over-­‐form	   rule	   of	   the	  United	   States	   of	   America,	   which	   Congress	   ultimately	  codified	   in	  March	   2010	   as	   §7701(o)	   of	   the	   United	   States	  Internal	  Revenue	  Code.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  “GAAR”	  refers	  both	  to	   legislated	   and	   to	   judicially	   created	   general	   anti-­‐avoidance	  rules.	  The	   first	   statutory	  GAAR	  appears	   to	  have	  been	  section	  29	   of	   the	   New	   Zealand	   Property	   Assessment	   Act	   1879,	  carried	   forward	   into	   section	   40	   of	   the	   Land	   and	   Income	  Assessment	  Act	  1891.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Since	  2007	  the	  New	  Zealand	  GAAR	  has	  appeared	  as	  section	  BG	  1	  of	  the	  Income	  Tax	  Act	  2007.	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Many	   countries	   enacted	   GAARs	   during	   the	   Twentieth	  Century,	   but	   several	   major	   economies	   did	   so	   only	   in	  relatively	   recent	   years:	   China	   2007,3	   USA	   2010,4	   as	  mentioned,	   United	   Kingdom	   2013,5	   and	   India	   2013,6	   to	  come	  into	  force	  in	  2016.	  In	   any	   discussion	   of	   tax	   avoidance	   it	   can	   be	   helpful	   to	  divide	  substantive	  provisions	  of	  income	  tax	  legislation	  into	  two	  categories,	  GAARs	  and	  everything	  else.	  In	  this	  context,	  “everything	   else”	   includes	   both	   charging	   provisions	   and	  permissive	   or	   relieving	   provisions.	   Most	   tax	   legislation	  includes	   other	   kinds	   of	   law	   as	   well,	   such	   as	   rules	   about	  procedures	   for	   resolving	   disputes	   and	   rules	   governing	  administration,	   but	   such	   rules	   are	   not	   relevant	   to	   the	  present	  discussion.	  An	   example	   of	   a	   charging	   provision	   is	   a	   rule	   that	  imposes	  tax	  on	  the	  profits	  of	  businesses.7	  An	  example	  of	  a	  relieving	  provision	   is	   a	   rule	   that	  permits	   taxpayers	  when	  they	  calculate	  business	  profits	  to	  deduct	  sums	  to	  allow	  for	  the	   depreciation	   of	   capital	   assets	   used	   in	   the	   business.8	  Some	   rules	   are	   hybrids,	   at	   the	   same	   time	   both	   charging	  provisions	   and	   relieving	   provisions,	   such	   as	   a	   rule	   that	  charges	  capital	  gains	  with	  tax,	  but	  at	  a	  rate	  lower	  than	  the	  rate	  that	  applies	  to	  income.9	  For	  conciseness,	  this	  chapter	  uses	  “charging	  provisions”	  both	  in	  its	  literal	  sense	  and	  as	  a	  generic	   term	   that	   applies	   equally	   to	   all	   three	   categories:	  charging,	   relieving,	   and	   hybrid	   provisions.	   The	   chapter	  often	   has	   occasion	   to	   distinguish	   between	   charging	  provisions	  on	  one	  hand	  and	  GAARs	  on	  the	  other.	  
II. Example	  of	  avoidance	  using	  a	  tax	  shelter	  Some	  of	  the	  most	  recognisable	  examples	  of	   tax	  avoidance	  involve	   structures	   known	   as	   “tax	   shelters”.	   Tax	   shelters	  are	  designed	  to	  reduce	  the	  tax	  otherwise	  payable	  on	  other	  income	   that	   taxpayers	   derive.	   Commonly,	   they	   involve	  apparently	  business-­‐like	  schemes	  that	  result	  in	  losses	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   Articles	   47	   and	   120,	   Enterprise	   Income	   Tax	   Law	   of	   the	   People’s	  Republic	  of	  China,	  Promulgation	  Order	  No	  63,	  16	  March	  2007.	  4	   26	   United	   States	   Internal	   Revenue	   Code	   §7701(o),	   enacted	   March	  2010.	  5	  Finance	  Act	  2013	  Part	  5,	  General	  Anti-­‐Abuse	  Rule,	  ss	  206	  -­‐	  215.	  6	   Income	   Tax	   Act	   1961	   ss	   123,	   124,	   125,	   154,	   291,	   enacted	   by	   the	  Finance	  Act	  2012. 7	  Eg,	   Income	  Tax	  Act	  2007	  s	  CB	  1(1)	   (NZ),	   “An	  amount	   that	  a	  person	  derives	  from	  a	  business	  is	  income	  of	  the	  person”.	  8	  Eg,	  Article	  101	  of	  the	  Decree	  of	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Republic	  Italy	  of	  22	   December	   1986,	   number	   917	   (The	   Italian	   Tax	   Code)	   (Art.	   101,	  D.P.R.	  22.12.1986	  n.	  917).	  9	   Eg,	   Internal	   Revenue	   Code	   §	   1(h)	   (USA)	   (26	  U.S.C.	   §	   1(h));	   Income	  Tax	   Act	   ((Einkommenssteuergesetz	   (EStG))	   §	   32d	  (Gesonderter	  Steuertarif	  für	  Einkünfte	  aus	  Kapitalvermögen)	  (Germany).	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for	   tax	   purposes	   can	   be	   set	   off	   against	   profits	   of	   other	  income,	  thus	  reducing	  the	  profits	  to	  be	  taxed	  and	  therefore	  the	   tax	   itself.	   Typically,	   the	   losses	   are	   losses	   for	   tax	  purposes	   only;	   taxpayers	   employing	   tax	   shelters	   do	   not	  ordinarily	   suffer	   economic	   costs	   or	   losses	   apart	   from	  transaction	   costs.10	   Other	   shelters	   operate	   by	   entitling	  taxpayers	  to	  claim	  a	  status	  that	  confers	  a	  reduction	  in	  tax.	  The	   structure	   that	  was	   the	   subject	  of	   the	  Australian	  High	  Court	   decision	   in	   Cridland	   v	   Federal	   Commissioner	   of	  
Taxation	  (1977)11	  is	  an	  example.	  Like	   many	   tax	   shelters,	   Cridland’s	   scheme	   exploited	   a	  provision	  designed	  to	  mitigate	  certain	  unfairness	  in	  the	  tax	  system.	   The	   unfairness	   in	   question	   arose	   from	   the	  progression	  of	  the	  Australian	  income	  tax	  scale	  as	  the	  scale	  operates	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   sharp,	   climate-­‐induced	  fluctuations	   typical	   in	   the	   income	   of	   many	   Australian	  farmers.	   Because	   of	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   rules	   for	   the	  taxation	   of	   trusts,	   this	   unfairness	   could	   bear	   particularly	  hard	   on	   beneficiaries	   of	   trusts	   that	   derived	   income	   from	  farming.	   A	   good	   year,	   where	   farming	   income	   had	   been	  taxed	   at	   a	   high	   rate	   on	   the	   progressive	   scale,	   might	   be	  followed	  by	  a	  poor	  year,	  with	  little	  or	  no	  income.	  But	   like	  most	  tax	  legislation,	  the	  Australian	  Income	  Assessment	  Act	  1936	   had	   no	   provision	   to	   shift	   income	   from	   good	   years	  into	   bad	   years,	   either	   forwards	   or	   backwards.	   The	   result	  was	   that	  beneficiaries	  who	  derived	   farming	   income	  could	  well	   be	   taxed	   at	   a	   higher	   average	   rate	   than	   people	   with	  similar	  income	  that	  was	  spread	  evenly	  from	  year	  to	  year.	  The	  Australian	  legislature	  addressed	  this	  unfairness	  by	  enacting	   Section	   157	   of	   the	   Income	   Tax	   Assessment	   Act	  1936	   (Cth),	   which	   allowed	   beneficiaries	   of	   trusts	   that	  derived	  income	  from	  primary	  production	  to	  average	  their	  income	  over	  several	  years,	  and	  to	  pay	  tax	  on	  the	  averaged	  sums.	   Where	   taxpayers	   qualified	   for	   this	   treatment,	  averaging	  applied	  to	  all	  their	  income,	  not	  solely	  to	  farming	  income	  derived	  via	  trusts.	  Cridland	   was	   in	   a	   position	   of	   having	   income	   that	  fluctuated,	   or	   that	   would	   fluctuate,	   in	   that	   he	   was	   a	  university	  student	  in	  the	  modest	  circumstances	  typical	  of	  a	  student,	  but	  he	  hoped	  to	   find	  a	  well-­‐paying	  position	  after	  graduation.	  To	  qualify	  himself	  after	  graduation	  to	  average	  his	  income	  for	  tax	  purposes	  Cridland	  purchased	  a	  unit	  (in	  effect,	  a	  share)	   in	  a	  unit	   trust	   that	   farmed	  cattle.	  The	  unit	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	   Film	   production	   is	   a	   popular	   example.	   See,	   eg,	   Ensign	   Tankers	  
(Leasing)	  Ltd	  v	  Stokes	  (Inspector	  of	  Taxes)	  [1992]	  1	  AC	  655,	  64	  TC	  617	  (HL)	   and	  Peterson	   v	   Commissioner	   of	   Inland	   Revenue	   [2006]	   3	   NZLR	  433,	  (2005)	  22	  NZTC	  19,098	  (PC).	  
11	   Cridland	   v	   Federal	   Commissioner	   of	   Taxation	   (1977)	   140	   CLR	   330	  (HCA).	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cost	  very	  little.	  The	  trust	  had	  been	  established	  to	  afford	  to	  students	   precisely	   such	   an	   opportunity.	   Its	   objective	  was	  to	   ensure	   that	   beneficiaries	   derived	   some	   income	   from	  primary	  production,	  albeit	  very	  little.	  Armed	  with	  his	  unit,	  Cridland,	  now	  a	  salaried	  engineer,	  submitted	  his	   tax	   return	  with	  his	   salary	   spread	  back	   into	  his	   impecunious	   student	   years.	   The	   Commissioner	  declined	   to	   accept	   Cridland’s	   calculations	   and	   taxed	   his	  salary	   according	   to	   the	   year	   when	   it	   was	   derived.	   The	  Commissioner	   relied	   on	   the	   Australian	   GAAR	   as	   it	   then	  stood,	  section	  260	  of	  the	  Income	  Tax	  Assessment	  Act	  1936	  (Cth),	  which	  read:	  Every	   contract,	   agreement,	   or	   arrangement	   made	   or	  entered	  into,	  orally	  or	  in	  writing,	  whether	  before	  or	  after	  the	   commencement	   of	   this	   Act,	   shall	   so	   far	   as	   it	   has	   or	  purports	   to	   have	   the	   purpose	   or	   effect	   of	   in	   any	   way,	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  —	  (a)	  altering	  the	  incidence	  of	  any	  income	  tax;	  	  (b)	  relieving	  any	  person	  from	  liability	  to	  pay	  any	  income	  tax	  or	  make	  any	  return;	  (c)	  defeating,	   evading	   or	   avoiding	   any	   duty	   or	   liability	  imposed	  on	  any	  person	  by	  this	  Act;	  or	  (d)	  preventing	  the	  operation	  of	  this	  Act	  in	  any	  respect,	  be	   absolutely	   void,	   as	   against	   the	   Commissioner,	   or	   in	  regard	   to	   any	   proceeding	   under	   this	   Act,	   but	   without	  prejudice	   to	   such	   validity	   as	   it	   may	   have	   in	   any	   other	  respect	  or	  for	  any	  other	  purpose.	  Cridland	   objected.	   The	   case	  made	   its	   way	   to	   the	   High	  Court	   of	   Australia	   where,	   surprisingly,	   at	   least	   to	   a	   non-­‐Australian,	   Cridland	  won,	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   he	   did	   in	   fact	  derive	  income	  from	  primary	  production.	  It	  did	  not	  matter	  that	   hardly	   any	   of	   Cridland’s	   income	   was	   from	   farming,	  nor	  that	  his	  claim	  to	  be	  a	  farmer	  was	  based	  on	  nothing	  of	  substance.	   One	   would	   think	   it	   clear	   enough	   that	   under	  section	   260	   Cridland’s	   scheme	   was	   void	   against	   the	  Commissioner	  as,	  inter	  alia,	  an	  	  arrangement	  [that	  had]	  …	  the	  purpose	  or	  effect	  of	  in	  any	  way,	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  —	  (a)	  altering	   the	   incidence	   of	   any	   income	   tax;	   [or	   of]	  (b)	  relieving	  any	  person	  from	  liability	  to	  pay	  any	  income	  tax	  	  In	   the	   submission	   of	   the	   present	   author,	   the	   Cridland	  case	  is	  so	  much	  an	  egregious	  example	  of	  a	  tax	  shelter	  that	  it	   is	   almost	   a	   caricature	   of	   tax	   avoidance,	   albeit	   that	  Cridland	   was	   in	   fact	   successful	   before	   the	   courts.	   One	  result	   was	   that	   the	   Federal	   Parliament	   replaced	   section	  260	  in	  1980	  with	  a	  much	  more	  complex	  GAAR.12	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Part	  IVA,	  Income	  Tax	  Assessment	  Act	  1936	  (Cth).	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III. The	  fundamental	  problem	  of	  GAARs	  The	  major	  difficulty	  posed	  by	  a	  GAAR	  is	  that	  on	  one	  hand	  a	  provision	   of	   a	   tax	   code	   permits	   the	   taxpayer	   to	   do	  whatever	   it	   is	   that	  he	  or	   she	  purports	   to	  do	  and	   to	  enjoy	  the	   fiscal	   benefits	   that	   the	   provision	   affords	   (or	   that	   the	  general	   structure	   affords).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   a	   GAAR	   in	  effect	  prohibits	  the	  taxpayer	  from	  relying	  on	  the	  provision	  in	  question.	  This	  position	  obtains	  even	  though	  the	  GAAR’s	  prohibition	  is	  expressed	  generally	  and	  that	  the	  permissive	  provision	   is	   specific.	   For	   instance,	   one	   rule	   may	   permit	  taxpayers	   to	   deduct	   certain	   expenses	   in	   calculating	  assessable	   income;13	   and	   another	   rule	   may	   permit	  taxpayers	   to	   rely	   on	   a	   defined	   status,	   being	   a	   status	   that	  confers	   tax	  benefits.14	  But	  a	  GAAR	  may	  purport	   to	  negate	  both	   those	  permissive	  rules,	  at	   least	   in	   the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  case	  in	  question.	  Worse,	  if	  the	  GAAR	  does	  override	  a	  permissive	   rule	   the	   overriding	   appears	   to	   breach	   the	  principle	   of	   statutory	   construction	   known	   as	   generalia	  
specialibus	   non	   derogant	   (general	   provisions	   do	   not	  derogate	  from	  specific	  rules).	  The	  Cridland	  case,	  discussed	  in	  section	  II	  of	  this	  chapter,	  illustrates	   the	   problem.	   According	   to	   section	   157	   of	   the	  Australian	   Income	   Tax	   Assessment	   Act	   1936,	   Cridland	  qualified	   to	   spread	   his	   income	   back	   into	   earlier	   years	  because	  he	  derived	  income	  from	  farming,	  albeit	  very	  little.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  obvious	  to	  the	  present	  author	  that	  Cridland’s	   scheme	   had	   no	   purpose	   other	   than	   tax	  avoidance,	  and	  therefore	  should	  have	  been	  held	  to	  be	  void	  against	  the	  Federal	  Commissioner	  of	  Taxation.	  The	  present	  author	  has	  argued	  elsewhere	   that,	  despite	  its	   apparent	   contradictory	   nature	   and	   other	   defects,	   a	  GAAR	   is	   a	  worthwhile,	   even	   a	   necessary,	   component	   of	   a	  tax	  code,	  at	  least	  of	  an	  income	  tax	  code.15	  But	  this	  necessity	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Eg,	  Cecil	  Bros	  Pty	  Ltd	  v	  Federal	  Commissioner	  of	  Taxation	  (1964)	  111	  CLR	  430	  (HCA,	  FC).	  14	  Eg,	  Cridland	  v	  Federal	  Commissioner	  of	  Taxation	  (1977)	  140	  CLR	  330	  (HCA,	  FC).	  15	   Eg,	   Prebble,	   John,	   Rebecca	   Prebble	   &	   Catherine	   Vidler	   Smith,	  “Retrospective	  Legislation:	  Reliance,	   the	  Public	   Interest,	   Principles	  of	  Interpretation	   and	   the	   Special	   Case	   of	   Anti-­‐Avoidance	   Legislation”	  (2006)	  22	  NZULR	  271–299;	  Zoë	  Prebble	  and	  John	  Prebble	  (2010)	  “The	  Morality	   of	   Tax	   Avoidance”	   20	   Creighton	   Law	   Review	   (Symposium	  Issue:	   Estate	   Planning,	   Moral,	   Religious,	   and	   Ethical	   Perspectives)	  693–745;	  Rebecca	  Prebble	  and	  John	  Prebble	  “Does	  the	  Use	  of	  General	  Anti-­‐Avoidance	   Rules	   to	   Combat	   Tax	   Avoidance	   Breach	   Principles	   of	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law?	  A	  Comparative	  Study”	  (2011)	  55	  St	  Louis	  University	  Law	   Journal	   (Symposium	   Issue,	   Sanford	   E.	   Sarasohn	   Memorial	  Conference	  on	  Critical	  Theory	  in	  Taxation)	  21–45.	  Amplified	  version	  in	  Susy	   Frankel	   (ed)	   Learning	   from	   the	   Past,	   Adapting	   for	   the	   Future:	  Regulatory	  Reform	  in	  New	  Zealand	  (LexisNexis,	  Wellington,	  2011),	  all	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does	   not	   make	   GAARs	   easy	   to	   apply.	   A	   fundamental	  reason,	   probably	   the	   fundamental	   reason,	   is	   that	   GAARs	  may	   appear	   to	   breach,	   and,	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   substance,	  arguably	  do	  in	  fact	  breach,	  the	  logic	  behind	  the	  principle	  of	  exclusion	   of	   contradictions,	   often	   called	   the	   “principle	   of	  non-­‐contradiction”.	  
IV. Aristotle	  Aristotle	   explained	   the	   principle	   of	   non-­‐contradiction	   in	  some	  detail,	  but	  for	  present	  purposes	  Gottlieb’s	  simplified	  summary	  is	  sufficient:16	  According	   to	   Aristotle,	   first	   philosophy,	   or	  metaphysics,	  deals	   with	   ontology	   and	   first	   principles,	   of	   which	   the	  principle	   (or	   law)	   of	   non-­‐contradiction	   is	   the	   firmest.	  Aristotle	   says	   that	   without	   the	   principle	   of	   non-­‐contradiction	   we	   could	   not	   know	   anything	   that	   we	   do	  know.	   Presumably,	   we	   could	   not	   demarcate	   the	   subject	  matter	  of	  any	  of	  the	  special	  sciences,	  for	  example,	  biology	  or	  mathematics,	  and	  we	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  distinguish	  between	  what	  something	   is,	   for	  example	  a	  human	  being	  or	  a	  rabbit,	  and	  what	  it	  is	  like,	  for	  example	  pale	  or	  white.	  Aristotle's	  own	  distinction	  between	  essence	  and	  accident	  would	   be	   impossible	   to	   draw,	   and	   the	   inability	   to	   draw	  distinctions	   in	   general	   would	   make	   rational	   discussion	  impossible.	   According	   to	   Aristotle,	   the	   principle	   of	   non-­‐contradiction	   is	   a	   principle	   of	   scientific	   inquiry,	  reasoning	   and	   communication	   that	   we	   cannot	   do	  without.	  Gotlieb	  identifies	  three	  versions	  of	  the	  principle:17	  1.	  It	  is	  impossible	  for	  the	  same	  thing	  to	  belong	  and	  not	  to	  belong	   at	   the	   same	   time	   to	   the	   same	   thing	   and	   in	   the	  same	   respect	   (with	   the	   appropriate	   qualifications)	  (Metaph	  IV	  3	  1005b19–20).	  2.	  It	  is	  impossible	  to	  hold	  (suppose)	  the	  same	  thing	  to	  be	  and	  not	  to	  be	  (Metaph	  IV	  3	  1005b24	  cf.1005b29–30).	  3.	   Opposite	   assertions	   cannot	   be	   true	   at	   the	   same	   time	  (Metaph	  IV	  6	  1011b13–20).	  We	  could	  usefully	  test	  the	  operation	  of	  a	  GAAR	  against	  any	  or	  all	  of	   the	  three	  versions,	  but	  the	  third	  seems	  to	  be	  the	   most	   apt.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   income	   tax	   law,	   the	  principle	   of	   non-­‐contradiction	   seems	   to	   tell	   us	   that	   we	  cannot	   assert	   as	   true	   that	   a	   particular	   transaction	   is	   not	  taxable	   according	   to	   ordinary	   charging	   provisions	   of	   the	  statute	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  that	  the	  transaction	  is	  taxable	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  available	   on	   the	   author’s	   SSRN	   pages,	  	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=115459.	  16	   Gottlieb,	   Paula,	   "Aristotle	   on	   Non-­‐contradiction",	   The	   Stanford	  
Encyclopedia	   of	   Philosophy	   (Spring	   2013	   Edition),	   Edward	   N.	  Zalta	  (ed.),	  http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/aristotle-­‐noncontradiction/.	  17	  Idem.	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according	   to	   the	   GAAR.	   And	   yet,	   on	   the	   face	   of	   it,	   that	  contradiction	  is	  precisely	  the	  effect	  of	  applying	  a	  GAAR.	  We	  sense	   intuitively	  that	   the	  argument	   in	  the	  previous	  paragraph	   may	   not	   be	   the	   last	   word	   on	   the	   subject.	  Aristotle’s	   principle	   of	   non-­‐contradiction	   is	   tolerably	  compelling	  in	  the	  field	  of	  facts.	  One	  can	  accept	  that	  it	  is	  at	  least	  improbable	  that	  something	  can	  at	  the	  same	  time	  both	  be	   a	   rabbit	   and	   not	   be	   a	   rabbit.	   But	   does	   the	   same	  reasoning	   necessarily	   apply	   to	   norms?	   There	   seems,	  somehow,	  more	  possibility	  that	  the	  norms	  “you	  ought	  not	  to	  kill”	  and	  “you	  may	  kill”	  could	  coexist	  than	  could	  the	  facts	  of	  rabbit	  and	  non-­‐rabbit.	  Our	   intuition	   is	   correct.	   To	   a	   non-­‐philosopher	   the	  following	   two	   norms	   appear	   to	   constitute	   a	   logical	  contradiction:	  “The	  Commissioner	  ought	  to	  charge	  X	  tax	  on	  his	  income”	  and	  “The	  Commissioner	  ought	  not	  to	  charge	  X	  tax	  on	  his	   income”.	   	  As	  section	  V	  of	   this	  chapter	  explains,	  Kelsen	  tells	  us	  that	  this	  situation	  is	  not	  strictly	  speaking	  a	  contradiction.	  The	  reason	  is	  that	  the	  conflicting	  statements	  are	   “ought”	   statements,	   not	   “is”	   statements.	   Since	  neither	  statement	   claims	   that	   something	   “is”,	   the	   statements	  cannot	  contradict	  or	  be	  contradicted.18	  While	  this	  may	  be	  the	  strict	  philosophical	  position	  there	  is	   more	   to	   say	   from	   a	   fiscal	   perspective.	   Take	   again	   the	  
Cridland	   case,	   discussed	   in	   section	   II.	   The	   claim	   seems	  unmeritorious	  on	   its	   face.	  But	   the	   taxpayer	  has	   at	   least	   a	  semblance	  of	  a	  grievance	  if	  on	  one	  hand	  the	  statute	  allows	  him	   to	   spread	   his	   income	   for	   tax	   purposes	   and	   on	   the	  other	   hand	   denies	   him	   that	   right.	   The	   contradiction	  may	  not	   be	   a	   true	   contradiction	   in	   philosophical	   terms,	   but	  taxpayers	  can	  be	  forgiven	  for	  thinking	  that	  it	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  a	  contradiction	  that	  merits	  study.	  Such	  study	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  sections	  of	  this	  chapter	  that	  follow.	  
V. Kelsen	  The	   question	   that	   terminates	   the	   previous	   paragraph	   of	  this	   chapter	   is	   an	   example	   of	   the	   kind	   of	   question	   that	  Kelsen	   addressed	   in	   his	   book,	   Pure	   Theory	   of	   Law,19	  published	   in	   English	   in	   1967.	   Pure	   Theory	   of	   Law	   was	   a	  translation	   of	   the	   second	   edition	   of	   Kelsen’s	   Reine	  
Rechtslehre,	   1960,	   being	   a	   completely	   revised	   edition	   of	  the	   first	   edition	   of	   1934.	   Professor	   Max	   Knight,	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	   Kelsen,	   Hans,	   General	   Theory	   of	   Norms,	   Trans	   Hartney,	   Michael	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  1991)	  163–164,	  213–214,	  219.	  19	   Kelsen,	   Hans,	   Pure	   Theory	   of	   Law,	   Trans	   Max	   Knight	   (1967)	  Berkeley,	  Calif,	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  73–74.	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translator,	   explained	   Kelsen’s	   mission	   in	   Pure	   Theory	   of	  
Law	  in	  his	  “Translator’s	  Preface”.	  He	  said	  that	  Kelsen:20	  …	   attempts	   to	   solve	   the	   fundamental	   problems	   of	   a	  general	   theory	   of	   law	   according	   to	   the	   principles	   of	  methodological	  purity	  of	  jurisprudential	  cognition	  and	  to	  determine	  to	  a	  greater	  extent	  than	  before	  the	  position	  of	  the	  science	  of	  law	  in	  the	  system	  of	  the	  sciences.	  Considering	  these	  overall	  objectives,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  in	  Kelsen’s	  opinion	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  the	  principle	  of	   non-­‐contradiction	   applies	   as	  well	   to	   norms	   as	   to	   facts	  was	   a	   question	   worthy	   of	   consideration.	   Among	   other	  things,	   answering	   the	   question	   should	   help	   to	   place	   the	  science	   of	   law	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   system	   of	   sciences	   that	  addresses	   facts.	   Kelsen	   had	   already	   addressed	   the	  question	   in	  General	   Theory	   of	   Law	   and	   State,21	   where	   he	  concluded:	  The	   judgments	   “A	   ought	   to	   be”	   and	   “A	   ought	   not	   to	   be”	  (for	   example,	   “you	   ought	   to	   speak	   the	   truth”	   and	   “you	  ought	   not	   to	   speak	   the	   truth”	   are	   just	   as	   incompatible	  with	  one	  another	  as	  “A	  is”	  and	  “A	  is	  not”.	  For	  the	  principle	  of	   contradiction	   is	   quite	   as	   valid	   for	   cognition	   in	   the	  sphere	  of	   normative	   validity	   as	   it	   is	   in	   that	   of	   empirical	  reality.	   [Kelsen	  wrote	  of	   the	  “principle	  of	  contradiction”,	  but	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  he	  used	  this	  expression	  to	  mean	  what	  others	   mean	   by	   the	   “principle	   of	   non-­‐contradiction”.	  When	   he	   came	   to	   Pure	   Theory	   of	   Law	   Kelsen	   used	   the	  more	   informative	   label,	   the	   “Principle	   of	   Exclusion	   of	  Contradictions”.22]	  By	   1960	   it	   seems	   that	   Kelsen	   had	   realised	   that	   this	  passage	   was	   an	   over-­‐simplification	   and	   that	   logically	   he	  could	   not	   argue	   that	   the	   principle	   of	   non-­‐contradiction	  applied	   in	   the	   same	  manner	   to	   norms	   as	   it	   does	   to	   facts.	  Although	   still	   writing	   in	   the	   magisterial	   tone	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Id,	  v.	  21Kelsen,	   Hans,	   General	   Theory	   of	   Law	   and	   State,	   Trans	   Anders	  Wedberg	  (1945)	  Cambridge,	  Mass,	  408.	  22	  Kelsen	  used	  lower	  case	  initial	  letters	  for	  “principle	  of	  contradiction”	  in	   General	   Theory	   of	   Law	   and	   State	   (text	   accompanying	   previous	  footnote)	   but	   there	   are	   initial	   capitals	   for	   “Principle	   of	   Exclusion	   of	  Contradictions”	   in	   Pure	   Theory	   of	   Law	   (text	   at	   fn	   27).	   It	   seems	  probable	   that	   it	   was	   Kelsen’s	   idea	   to	   keep	   the	   capital	   letters	   in	   the	  style	   of	   the	   German	   language.	   Max	   Knight,	   the	   translator,	   was	  conscious	   that	   the	  style	  of	  Pure	  Theory	  of	  Law	  wears	   its	  origin	  on	   its	  sleeve.	  Knight	  wrote,	   “This	   translation,	  carefully	  checked	  by	  [Kelsen],	  represents	  a	  compromise	  between	  a	  contents-­‐conscious	  author	  and	  a	  form-­‐conscious	   translator.	   Kelsen’s	   immense	   experience	   with	  misinterpretations	   of	   his	   works	   as	   a	   result	   of	   “elegant”	   translations	  had	  to	  be	  the	  deciding	  factor	  when	  seemingly	  repetitious	  or	  Germanic-­‐sounding	  passages,	  expunged	  from	  or	  rephrased	  in	  an	  earlier	  draft	  of	  the	   translation	  as	   too	   literally	  mirroring	   the	  original,	  were	   restored.”	  “Translator’s	   Preface”,	   Kelsen,	   Hans,	   Pure	   Theory	   of	   Law,	   Trans	  Max	  Knight	  (1967)	  Berkeley,	  Calif,	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  vi.	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characterises	   Pure	   Theory	   of	   Law	   Kelsen	   refined	   and	  diluted	  his	  conclusion.23	  In	   Pure	   Theory	   of	   Law,	   Kelsen	   started	   from	   the	  proposition	   that	   the	   canonical	   form	  of	   a	   legal	   norm	   is	   an	  ought	   statement	   in	   the	   form	   of,	   “If	   somebody	   steals	   he	  ought	   to	   be	   punished”.24	   Kelsen	   resiled	   from	   the	   broad	  proposition	   quoted	   from	   General	   Theory	   of	   Law	   and	  
State,25	  above,	  and	  conceded	  that:26	  Since	   legal	   norms,	   being	   prescriptions	   (that	   is,	  commands,	   permissions,	   authorizations),	   can	   neither	   be	  true	   nor	   false,	   the	   question	   arises:	   how	   can	   logical	  principles,	   especially	   the	   Principle	   of	   the	   Exclusion	   of	  Contradiction27	   …	   be	   applied	   to	   the	   relation	   between	  legal	   norms,	   if,	   according	   to	   traditional	   views	   these	  principles	   are	   applicable	   only	   to	   assertions	   that	   can	   be	  true	   or	   false?	   The	   answer	   is:	   logical	   principles	   are	  applicable,	   indirectly,	   to	   legal	   norms	   to	   the	   extent	   that	  they	  are	  applicable	  to	  the	  rules	  of	  law	  which	  describe	  the	  
legal	   norms	   and	   which	   can	   be	   true	   or	   false.	   Two	   legal	  norms	   are	   contradictory	   and	   can	   therefore	   not	   both	   be	  valid	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   if	   the	   two	   rules	   of	   law	   that	  describe	  them	  are	  contradictory	  ….	  Two	  clues	   to	   the	   import	  of	   this	  passage	  are	   the	  words,	  “indirectly”	   and	   the	   meaning	   that	   Kelsen	   gives	   to	   the	  expression	   “rules	  of	   law”	   (both	   italicised	  above).	   In	  using	  “indirectly”	  Kelsen	  admits	  that,	   logically,	  he	  must	  concede	  that	  he	  cannot	  apply	  the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐contradiction	  to	  legal	   norms.	   	   The	   meaning	   that	   Kelsen	   gives	   to	   the	  expression	   a	   “rule	   of	   law”	   amplifies	   the	   reason.	   Kelsen	  explains	  that	  by	  “rule	  of	  law”	  he	  means	  not	  a	  norm,	  such	  as	  a	   law	   promulgated	   by	   a	   legislator,	   but	   a	   “statement	  formulated	   by	   the	   science	   of	   law	   …	   describing	   [the]	  norm,”28	   such	  as	  a	  description	  of	   the	  norm	   that	  a	   scholar	  might	  write.	  For	  example,	  a	  legislator	  might	  promulgate	  a	  norm	   may	   “prescribing	   execution	   against	   a	   person	   who	  does	   not	   fulfil	   a	   marriage	   promise	   and	   does	   not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	   In	   discussing	   the	   principle	   of	   non-­‐contradiction,	   Kelsen	   did	   not	  mention	   Aristotle	   in	   either	  General	   Theory	   of	   Law	   and	   State	  or	   Pure	  
Theory	  of	  Law,	  though	  the	  index	  to	  the	  former	  contains	  six	  references	  to	  Aristotle	   in	  other	  contexts.23	  No	  doubt	  Kelsen	  thought	   that	  he	  was	  writing	   for	  erudite	  readers	   for	  whom	  references	   to	  Aristotle’s	  role	   in	  the	  development	  of	  Western	  philosophy	  would	  be	  supererogatory.	  24	   Kelsen,	   Hans,	   Pure	   Theory	   of	   Law,	   Trans	   Max	   Knight	   (1967)	  Berkeley,	  Calif,	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  75.	  25	  Though	  Pure	  Theory	  of	  Law	  does	  not	  mention	  General	  Theory	  of	  Law	  
and	  State	  in	  the	  context	  under	  discussion	  here.	  26	   Kelsen,	   Hans,	   Pure	   Theory	   of	   Law,	   Trans	   Max	   Knight	   (1967)	  Berkeley,	  Calif,	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  74,	  emphasis	  added.	  27	  In	  Pure	  Theory	  of	  Law,	  Kelsen	  adopted	  this	  more	  expansive	  label	  for	  what	  he	  had	   called	   simply	   “the	  principle	  of	   contradiction”	   in	  General	  
Theory	  of	  Law	  and	  State.	  See	  passage	  quoted	  at	  fn	  21	  of	  this	  chapter.	  28	   Kelsen,	   Hans,	   Pure	   Theory	   of	   Law,	   Trans	   Max	   Knight	   (1967)	  Berkeley,	  Calif,	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  73.	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compensate	   for	   the	   damage,”29	   whereas	   a	   scholar’s	  description	  of	  this	  norm	  might	  say,	  “…	  	  that	  execution	  [that	  is,	  civil	  execution,	  such	  as	  a	  bailiff’s	  seizure	  and	  sale	  of	  the	  goods	  of	   the	  defendant]	  ought	   to	  be	  carried	  out	  against	  a	  person	  who	   does	   not	   fulfil	   a	  marriage	   promise	   and	   does	  not	  compensate	  for	  the	  damage.”30	  The	   discussion	   just	   described	   occurs	   on	   pages	   73	   and	  74	  of	  Pure	  Theory	  of	  Law.	  Kelsen	  returns	  to	  the	  Principle	  of	  Exclusion	  of	  Contradictions	  on	  pages	  205–207	  with	  more	  confidence,	  and	  asserts	  that:31	  [L]ogical	   principles	   in	   general	   and,	   and	   the	   Principle	   of	  the	   Exclusion	   of	   Contradictions	   in	   particular,	   are	  applicable	   to	   rules	   of	   law	   describing	   legal	   norms	   and	  therefore	  indirectly	  also	  to	  legal	  norms.	  Hence	  it	  is	  by	  no	  means	   absurd	   to	   say	   that	   two	   legal	   norms	   “contradict”	  each	  another.	  And	   therefore	  only	  one	  of	   the	   two	   can	  be	  regarded	   as	   objectively	   valid.	   To	   say	   that	  a	   ought	   to	   be	  done	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  done	  is	  just	  as	  meaningless	   as	   to	   say	   at	   the	   same	   time	   that	  a	   is	   and	   at	  the	  same	  time	  that	  it	  is	  not.	  A	  conflict	  of	  norms	  is	  just	  as	  meaningless	  as	  a	  logical	  contradiction.	  For	   Kelsen,	   a	   conflict	   of	   norms	   within	   a	   single	   legal	  system	  was	   a	   serious	  matter.	   One	   norm,	   or	   the	   other,	   or	  perhaps	  both,	  must	  be	  invalid.32	  It	  behoves	  us,	  therefore	  to	  resolve	  the	  conflict	  if	  at	  all	  possible,	  either	  by	  applying	  the	  principle	  of	  statutory	  interpretation,	  lex	  posterior	  derogate	  
priori33	   or	   by	   construing	   the	   two	   apparently	   conflicting	  norms	   to	   understand	   that	   they	   are	   in	   fact	   separate,	  with	  one	   norm	   creating	   an	   exception	   to	   the	   other.34	  Nevertheless35	  If	  neither	  the	  one	  nor	  the	  other	  interpretation	  is	  possible,	  then	   the	   legislator	   creates	   something	   meaningless;	   we	  have	   then	   a	   meaningless	   act	   of	   norm	   creation	   and	  therefore	  no	  act	  at	  all	  [that	  is,	  nothing	  that	  can	  be	  called	  a	  norm]	  whose	   subjective	  meaning	   can	   be	   interpreted	   as	  its	   objective	  meaning;	  no	  objectively	   valid	   legal	  norm	   is	  present	  ….	  Serious	  matter	  though	  this	  outcome	  may	  be	  in	  theory,	  is	  it	   a	   matter	   for	   serious	   concern?	   One	   bears	   in	   mind	   that	  Kelsen’s	   argument	   reaches	   this	   outcome,	   by	   his	   own	  admission,	   only	   “indirectly”,	   and	   only	   by	   almost	   re-­‐defining	  his	  terms	  from	  “legal	  norms”	  to	  a	  special	  meaning	  of	   “legal	   rules”	   that	   Kelsen	   seems	   to	   invent	   for	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Idem.	  30	  Idem.	  31	   Kelsen,	   Hans,	   Pure	   Theory	   of	   Law,	   Trans	   Max	   Knight	   (1967)	  Berkeley,	  Calif,	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  206.	  32	   The	   present	   author’s	   deduction	   by	   implication	   from	  Kelsen,	   Hans,	  
Pure	   Theory	   of	   Law,	   Trans	   Max	   Knight	   (1967)	   Berkeley,	   Calif,	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  206.	  33	  A	  later	  [inconsistent]	  law	  overrides	  an	  earlier	  law.	  34	  Id	  206–207.	  35	  Id	  207.	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occasion.	   Further,	   while	   they	   are	   logically	   correct,	   the	  examples	   that	   Kelsen	   gives	   are	   not	   particularly	   realistic,	  for	  instance	  a	  statute	  that	  stipulates	  both	  that	  “adultery	  is	  punishable	  and	  adultery	  is	  not	  punishable”.36	  One	  suspects	  that	   if	   there	  are	  examples	  of	   true	  contradictions	  between	  legal	   norms	   they	   are	   most	   likely	   to	   have	   occurred	   by	  mistake.	   It	   is	   not	   surprising	   that	   later	   in	   life	   Kelsen	  changed	   his	   mind	   about	   his	   belief	   expressed	   in	   Pure	  
Theory	   of	   Law	   that	   if	   legal	   norms	   contradict	   each	   other	  there	   is	   a	   breach	   of	   the	   Principle	   of	   the	   Exclusion	   of	  Contradiction,	   such	   breach	   resulting	   in	   invalidity	   of	   the	  norms	  in	  question.37	  Nevertheless,	  there	  was	  more	  utility	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  Principle	  of	  Exclusion	  of	  Contradictions	  in	  Pure	  Theory	  
of	   Law	   than	   Kelsen	   eventually	   claimed.	   The	   discussion	  might	   shed	   limited	   light	   on	   law	   in	   general,	   but	   the	  discussion	  contributes	  substantially	   to	  our	  understanding	  of	  general	  anti-­‐avoidance	  rules	  in	  tax	  statutes.	  
VI. GAARs	   and	   the	   Principle	   of	   Exclusion	   of	  
Contradictions	  The	   world	   has	   increasing	   numbers	   of	   GAARs,	   each	   duly	  enacted	   by	   its	   legislature,	   and	   each	   recognised	   as	   law	  by	  courts	  that	  have	  jurisdiction	  in	  tax	  cases.	  GAARs	  are	  rarely	  attacked	   as	   unconstitutional,	   and	   such	   attacks	   generally	  fail.38	   Nevertheless,	   it	   is	   undeniable	   that	   at	   least	   at	   some	  level	  GAARs	  contradict	  charging	  or	  relieving	  provisions	  in	  income	  tax	  legislation.	  That	  is	  their	  purpose.	  Return	  to	  Cridland	  v	  Federal	  Commissioner	  of	  Taxation,39	  the	   example	   discussed	   in	   section	   II	   of	   this	   chapter.	   The	  taxpayer,	  Cridland,	  was	  undeniably	  a	  beneficiary	  of	  a	  trust	  and	   he	   undeniably	   derived	   income	   from	   primary	  production	   via	   that	   trust.	   In	   the	  words	   of	   section	   157	   of	  the	   Income	  Tax	  Assessment	  Act	  1936	   (Cth)	  Cridland	  was	  therefore	   entitled	   to	   spread	   his	   income	   backwards	   from	  the	  current	  year	  to	  earlier	  years	  in	  order	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	   the	   lower	   rate	   thresholds	   of	   those	   years,	   lower	   rates	  that	  Cridland	  had	  not	  exhausted	  at	   the	   time	  because	  as	  a	  non-­‐salaried	   student	  he	   then	  derived	  a	   lower	   income.	  On	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Id	  206.	  37	  See	  section	  XI	  of	  this	  chapter.	  38	  A	  leading	  example	  is	  National	  Federation	  of	  Independent	  Business	  v.	  
Sebelius,	   567	  U.S.	   ___	   (2012),	   132	   S.Ct	   2566,	   183	   L.	   Ed.	   2d	   450.	   Even	  this	   attack	   was	   flanking	   rather	   than	   head-­‐on,	   in	   that	   the	   taxpayer’s	  primary	  argument	  was	  that	  the	  Obama	  health	  reforms,	  adopted	  in	  the	  same	   statute	   as	   the	   American	   GAAR,	   namely	   The	   Patient	   Protection	  and	  Affordable	  Care	  Act	  2010,	  were	  unconstitutional.	  39	   Cridland	   v	   Federal	   Commissioner	   of	   Taxation	   (1977)	   140	   CLR	   330	  (HCA).	  
John	  Prebble:	  Kelsen	  and	  GAARs	  
	   13	  
the	   one	   hand,	   the	   High	   Court	   of	   Australia	   vindicated	  Cridland,	  holding	   that	  he	  was	  entitled	   to	  benefit	   from	  his	  tax	  minimisation	  scheme.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	  GAAR,	   section	  260	  of	   the	   same	  statute,	  quoted	  in	  full	  in	  section	  II	  of	  this	  chapter,	  said:	  Every	   …	   arrangement	   …	   shall	   so	   far	   as	   it	   has	   …	   the	  purpose	  or	  effect	  of	  in	  any	  way,	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  …	  (b)	  relieving	  any	  person	  from	  liability	  to	  pay	  any	  income	  tax	  …	  be	  absolutely	  void,	  as	  against	  the	  Commissioner	  ….	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  think	  of	  any	  purpose	  that	  the	  arrangement	  had	  apart	  from	  relieving	  Cridland	  of	  liability	  to	  pay	  income	  tax.	  Cridland	  owned	  only	  one	  unit	   in	   the	   farming	   trust	   in	  question;	  so	  the	  arrangement	  was	  certainly	  not	  a	  business	  or	   investment	  proposition	  on	  his	  part.	  On	  the	   facts	  of	   the	  case,	   there	   was	   no	   other	   conceivable	   purpose	   for	   the	  arrangement.	  As	  applied	  to	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  Cridland	  case,	  sections	  157	  and	  260	  of	  the	  Income	  Tax	  Assessment	  Act	  do	  appear	  to	  be	  in	   conflict,	   especially	   if	  we	   frame	   the	   conflict	   in	   terms	   of	  Kelsen’s	   explanation	   of	   scholars’	   descriptions	   of	   rules	   of	  law.	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  of	  this	  chapter.	  One	  rule,	   section	   157,	   provides	   that	   in	   calculating	   his	   income	  tax	   liability	   Cridland	   may	   claim	   the	   status	   of	   primary	  producer,	   together	   with	   the	   reduction	   in	   tax	   that	   this	  status	   confers.	   The	   other	   rule,	   section	   260,	   provides	   that	  Cridland	   ought	   not	   to	   claim	   this	   status	   and	   reduction	   in	  taxation.	   In	   1977	   the	   Australian	   High	   Court	   resolved	   the	  conflict	  by	  holding	   that	   section	  157	  prevailed,	   at	   least	  on	  the	  facts	  of	  that	  case.	  It	  is	  not	  likely	  that	  the	  High	  Court	  would	  reach	  the	  same	  conclusion	  today,	  but	  what	  the	  Cridland	  case	   illustrates	   is	  more	  general	  than	  the	  court’s	  actual	  conclusion.	  First,	   the	  case	   reminds	   us	   that,	   whatever	   the	   facts,	   a	   court	   must	  come	   to	  a	   conclusion	   in	  GAAR	  cases;	   courts	  are	  bound	   to	  decide	   GAAR	   cases	   just	   as	   they	   are	   bound	   to	   decide	   all	  cases.	   In	   this	   light,	   talk	   of	   conflict	   of	   norms	   somehow	  misses	   the	  point.	  No	  matter	  how	  conflicting	   two	   relevant	  norms	  seem	  to	  be,	  the	  court	  must	  resolve	  the	  conflict.	  But	  this	   conclusion	   is	   formal,	   even	   superficial.	   The	   problems	  with	  GAARs	  are	  much	  deeper.	  In	   the	   context	   of	   a	   discussion	   about	   the	   Principle	   of	  Exclusion	  of	  Contradictions	  one	  such	  problem	  stands	  out:	  what	   is	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   charging	   and	  relieving	   provisions	   of	   a	   taxing	   statute	   on	   one	   hand,	   and	  the	   statute’s	   GAAR	   on	   the	   other?	   As	   McCarthy	   P	   said,	   a	  GAAR	   that	  avoids	  arrangements	   that	  have	   the	  purpose	  of	  avoiding	   tax	   or	   of	   simply	   relieving	   a	   taxpayer	   from	   tax	  “cannot	   be	   given	   a	   literal	   application,	   for	   that	   would	   …	  result	   in	   the	   avoidance	   of	   transactions	   which	   were	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obviously	  not	  aimed	  at	  by	  the	  [GAAR].”40	  For	  instance,	  the	  GAAR	  would	  avoid	  a	  gift	  to	  charity	  made	  with	  a	  purpose	  of	  qualifying	   for	   a	   charitable	   deduction,	   which	   presumably	  cannot	   be	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   GAAR.	   Lord	   Wilberforce	  made	  the	  same	  point,	  in	  more	  detail.	  Speaking	  of	  the	  then	  New	  Zealand	  GAAR,	  he	  said	  in	  1971:41	  It	   fails	   to	   specify	   the	   relation	   between	   the	   section	   and	  other	   provisions	   in	   the	   Income	   Tax	   legislation	   under	  which	   tax	   reliefs,	   or	   exemptions,	  may	   be	   obtained.	   Is	   it	  legitimate	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	   these	   so	   as	   to	   avoid	   or	  reduce	   tax?	  What	   if	   the	  only	  purpose	   is	   to	  use	   them?	   Is	  there	   a	   distinction	   between	   "proper"	   tax	   avoidance	   and	  "improper"	   tax	   avoidance?	   By	   what	   sense	   is	   this	  distinction	  to	  be	  perceived?	  GAARs,	   and	   relieving	   provisions	   against	   which	  avoidance	   litigaton	   juxtapose	   GAARs,	   do	   not	   contradict	  each	   other	   in	   the	   strict	   sense	   of	   which	   Kelsen	   speaks	   in	  
Pure	  Theory	  of	  Law.	  Nevertheless,	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  is	  both	  substantive	  and	  practical,	  the	  tension	  between	  GAARs	  and	  relieving	  provisions	  is	  certainly	  a	  contradiction.	  The	  strict,	  logical,	  contradiction	  to	  which	  Kelsen	  refers	  may	  possibly	  be	   seen	   occasionally,	   though	   Kelsen	   gives	   no	   examples	  from	  history.	  Problems	  that	  may	  emerge	  from	  this	  kind	  of	  pure	   contradiction	   are	   largely	   hypothetical,	   like	   Kelsen’s	  example	   of	   rules	   that	   punish	   and	   that	   do	   not	   punish	  adultery.	   As	   mentioned,	   if	   true	   contradictions	   of	   legal	  norms	   exist	   within	   jurisdictions	   they	   are	   most	   likely	   to	  have	  occurred	  by	  mistake.	  In	   sharp	   contrast,	   the	   tension	   between	   GAARs	   and	  relieving	  provisions	  is	  an	  everyday	  conflict	  with	  which	  tax	  scholars,	   taxpayers,	   tax	   officials,	   and	   tax	   judges	   struggle	  daily,	   in	  many	   jurisdictions.	  The	  conflict	  between	  a	  GAAR	  and	  a	  relieving	  provision	  is	  far	  from	  a	  mistake;	  legislatures	  enact	  GAARs	  specifically	  to	  nullify	  transactions	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  unexceptionable.	  Like	   most	   legal	   philosophers,	   Kelsen	   wrote,	   and	  probably	   knew,	   little	   about	   tax	   law.	   It	   is	   unlikely	   that	   it	  occurred	  to	  Kelsen	  that	  tax	  law	  might	  be	  different	  in	  kind	  from	  most	   other	   areas	   of	   law42	   and	  unlikely	   that	   he	   ever	  made	  the	  acquaintance	  of	  a	  GAAR,	  that	  unusual	  species	  of	  law	   that	   is	  designed	  with	   an	   in-­‐built	   contradiction	   (using	  “contradiction”	  in	  a	  broad,	  substantive,	  sense).	  This	  is	  our	  loss.	   Legal	   science	   would	   most	   certainly	   have	   benefited	  from	  Kelsen’s	  thoughts.	  Nevertheless,	  although	  we	  cannot	  profit	  from	  thoughts	  that	  Kelsen	  undoubtedly	  would	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	   Commisioner	   of	   Inland	   Revenue	   v	   Gerard	   [1974]	   2	   NZLR	   279,	   280	  (CA).	  41	  Mangin	  v	  Commissioner	  of	  Inland	  Revenue	  [1971]	  NZLR	  591,	  602	  per	  Lord	  Wilberforce	  (dissenting)	  (PC).	  42	  See	  papers	  cited	  at	  fn	  15	  and	  fn	  70.	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had	   about	   GAARs	   specifically,	   his	   general,	   if	   somewhat	  hypothetical,	   thoughts	   about	   contradictory	   norms	   and	  about	   the	   Principle	   of	   Exclusion	   of	   Contradictions	   shed	  welcome	  light	  on	  this	  complex	  area	  of	  law.	  To	  summarise,	  GAARs	  and	  relieving	  provisions	  do	  contradict	  one	  another,	  even	   if	   only	   substantively	   and	   not	   in	   strict	   logic.	   Courts	  must	   struggle	   to	   resolve	   that	   contradiction.	   It	   helps,	   as	   a	  start,	  at	  least	  to	  recognise	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  problem.	  A	   good	  example	  of	  mischaracterisation	  of	   the	  problem	  occurred	   in	   the	  New	  Zealand	   Supreme	   Court	   case	   of	  Ben	  
Nevis	  Forestry	  Ventures	  Ltd	  &	  Ors	  v	  Commissioner	  of	  Inland	  
Revenue	   (2009),43	   a	   case	   about	   a	   tax	   shelter.	   The	   New	  Zealand	   Supreme	   Court	   was	   inaugurated	   in	   2004	   to	  replace	  the	  Judicial	  Committee	  of	  the	  Privy	  Council	  as	  New	  Zealand’s	   final	   court	  of	   appeal.	   Ben	  Nevis	  was	   the	  Court’s	  first	   tax	   avoidance	   case.	   Speaking	   for	   the	   majority,	  McGrath	   J	   explained	   that	   it	   was	   desirable	   to	   settle	   the	  approach	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  resolve	  the:44	  continuing	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  inter-­‐relationship	  of	  the	  general	   anti-­‐avoidance	   provision	   with	   specific	   [taxing	  and	  relieving]	  provisions”.	  [He	  continued:45]	  It	   is	   accordingly	   the	   task	   of	   the	   Courts	   to	   apply	   a	  principled	  approach	  which	  gives	  proper	  overall	  effect	  to	  statutory	   language	   that	   expresses	   different	   legislative	  policies.	   It	   has	   long	   been	   recognised	   those	   policies	  require	  reconciliation.46	  McGrath	   J’s	  words	  are	   a	   candid	   judicial	   statement	   that	  explicitly	   recognises	   a	   general	   category	   of	   contradictions	  between	   legal	   norms,	   being	   contradictions	   that	   are	  explained	  by	  contradictory	  policies	  (taxation	  or	  relief	  from	  tax	   on	   one	   hand,	   and	   the	   frustration	   of	   avoidance	   on	   the	  other).	  But	  can	  we	  agree	  with	  the	  attempt	  at	  reconciliation	  of	  the	  inconsistency?	  McGrath	  J	  adopted	  the	  metaphor	  of	  a	  tandem,	  and	  said:47	  We	  consider	  Parliament's	  overall	  purpose	  is	  best	  served	  by	   construing	   specific	   tax	   provisions	   and	   the	   general	  anti-­‐avoidance	  provision	  so	  as	  to	  give	  appropriate	  effect	  to	   each.	   They	   are	   meant	   to	   work	   in	   tandem.	   Each	  provides	   a	   context	   which	   assists	   in	   determining	   the	  meaning	   and,	   in	   particular,	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   other.	  Neither	   should	   be	   regarded	   as	   overriding.	   Rather	   they	  work	  together.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	   Ben	   Nevis	   Forestry	   Ventures	   Ltd	   &	   Ors	   v	   Commissioner	   of	   Inland	  
Revenue	  [2008]	  NZSC	  115,	  [2009]	  2	  NZLR	  289	  (SC).	  44	  Id	  [100]	  per	  McGrath	  J.	  45	  Id	  [102]	  per	  McGrath	  J.	  46	   Commisioner	   of	   Inland	   Revenue	   v	   Gerard	   [1974]	   2	   NZLR	   279,	   280	  (CA),	  per	  McCarthy	  P	  and	  Challenge	  Corporation	  Ltd	  v	  Commissioner	  of	  
Inland	  Revenue	  [1986]	  2	  NZLR	  513,	  549	  (CA	  and	  PC),	  per	  Richardson	  J,	  also	   reported	   as	   Commissioner	   of	   Inland	   Revenue	   v	   Challenge	  
Corporation	  Ltd	  [1987]	  AC	  155	  (PC).	  (Court’s	  footnote	  amplified.)	  47	  Id	  [103]	  per	  McGrath	  J.	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One	   is	   reduced	   to	   repeating	   “tandem”	   without	  managing	  to	  illuminate	  McGrath	  J’s	  meaning.	  To	  unpick	  the	  metaphor,	  assume	  that	  the	  front	  wheel	  and	  rider	  represent	  a	   charging	   or	   relieving	   provision,	   or	   an	   investment	  structure,	  relied	  upon	  by	  a	  scheme	  of	  minimisation	  of	   tax	  (using	   “minimisation”	   as	   a	  neutral	   term	   that	  may	  or	  may	  not	  entail	  the	  avoidance	  that	  is	  the	  target	  of	  a	  GAAR).	  The	  rear	  wheel	  and	  rider	  represent	  the	  GAAR.	  Assume	  further,	  that	   in	   the	   case	   at	   bar	   the	   correct	   conclusion	   is	   that	   the	  GAAR	   annihilates	   the	   scheme	   of	   tax	   minimisation	   as	   an	  arrangement	   that	   has	   a	   purpose	   of	   tax	   avoidance.	   What	  has	   happened	   to	   the	   tandem?	   Have	   the	   rear	   rider	   and	  wheel	   overtaken	   the	   front	   rider	   and	   wheel?	   Where	   a	  scheme	   for	   tax	   minimisation	   has	   fallen	   to	   a	   GAAR	   as	   an	  arrangement	  to	  avoid	  tax	  it	  is	  stretching	  things	  to	  say	  that	  the	   GAAR	   and	   the	   provisions	   on	   which	   the	   scheme	   to	  minimise	   tax	  work	   “together”.	  On	   the	  contrary,	   the	  GAAR	  switches	   off	   the	   benefit-­‐conferring	   rule	   on	  which	   the	   tax	  planner	  relied.	  The	  discussion	  of	  Ben	  Nevis	  Forestry	  Ventures	  Ltd	  &	  Ors	  
v	  Commissioner	  of	  Inland	  Revenue	  reveals	  that	  even	  though	  GAARs	   do	   not	   give	   rise	   to	   breaches	   of	   the	   Principle	   of	  Exclusion	   of	   Contradictions	   in	   the	   strict	   sense	   in	   which	  logicians	  use	  that	  expression,	  the	  tension	  between	  GAARs	  and	   relieving	   or	   other	   tax	   laws	   presents	   legal	   reasoning	  with	   challenges	   that	   are	   both	   similar	   to	   and	   dissimilar	  from	   the	   challenge	   of	   a	   conflict	   of	   norms:	   similar,	   in	   that	  we	  must	  resolve	  a	  conflict;	  dissimilar	  in	  that	  the	  challenges	  of	  GAARs	  are	  both	  practical	  and	   frequent,	   	   in	  comparison	  with	   true	   contradictions	  as	  Kelsen	  describes	   them,	  which	  are	   so	   rare	   as	   to	   be	   almost	   hypothetical.	   Ben	   Nevis	  demonstrates,	   further,	   that	   resolving	   the	   problem	   of	  GAARs	  is	  a	  problem	  worthy	  of	  Kelsen	  himself.	  
VII. Resolving	   conflicts	   between	   GAARs	   and	   other	   rules	  
of	  tax	  law	  As	   explained	   in	   the	   previous	   section	   of	   this	   chapter,	   the	  problem	   of	   resolving	   conflicts	   between	   GAARs	   and	   other	  rules	  of	   tax	   law	  does	  not	  map	  precisely	  onto	  the	  problem	  of	   repairing	   a	   breach	   of	   the	   Principle	   of	   Exclusion	   of	  Contradictions.	   Nevertheless,	   our	   approach	   must	   be	  similar.	  Kelsen	  does	  not	  explain	  what	   is	   to	  be	  done	  about	  such	   breaches,	   apart	   from	   recommending	   endeavours	   to	  interpret	  rules	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  them.48	  The	  reader	  infers	  that	  if	   a	   breach	   occurs	   it	   is	   probably	   necessary	   to	   resort	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	   Kelsen,	   Hans,	   Pure	   Theory	   of	   Law,	   Trans	   Max	   Knight	   (1967)	  Berkeley,	  Calif,	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  206.	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extra-­‐legal	   remedies.	   In	  a	  curious	  way,	   the	  same	  happens	  with	  GAARs.	  A	  court	  of	  final	  appeal	  may	  possibly	  resolve	  an	  issue	  of	  apparent	  conflict	  between	  norms	  with	  a	  response	  that	  can	  hardly	  be	  called	  “law”.	  The	  decision	  will	  be	  binding	  on	  the	  parties,	   but	   it	   may	   not	   solve	   a	   deep	   conflict	   between	  norms.	  Such	  a	  result	  is	  indeed	  often	  the	  position	  for	  cases	  that	   turn	   on	   GAARs,	   cases	   that	   are	   notoriously	  inconsistent.49	  The	   reason	   is	   that	   conflict	   between	   a	   charging	   or	  relieving	  provision	  of	  tax	  law	  and	  a	  GAAR	  logically	  cannot	  be	  resolved	  by	  reasoning	  that	   is	  strictly	   legalistic;	   if	   there	  are	   conflicting	   provisions	   of	   law	   of	   similar	   status	   the	  conflict	   can	   be	   resolved,	   if	   at	   all,	   only	   by	   reference	   to	  criteria	   that	   are	   outside	   the	   conflicting	   provisions.	   By	  definition,	  in	  the	  case	  that	  this	  chapter	  considers	  there	  are	  no	   legal	  provisions	   superior	   in	   the	  hierarchy	  of	  norms	  of	  the	  state	  in	  question	  to	  which	  the	  conflict	  can	  be	  referred	  for	   resolution.	   (If	   there	   were	   such	   superior	   norms	   we	  could	  not	  speak	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  conflict	  of	  norms.)	  Ultimately,	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  the	  criteria	  that	  have	  been	  mentioned,	  that	  is	   criteria	   that	   are	   outside	   the	   conflicting	   provisions,	   are	  not	   criteria	   of	   law	   but	   criteria	   of	   economic	   substance,	   or	  sometimes	  of	  morality,	  as	  will	  be	  explained.	  All	   this	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   courts	   do	   not	   try	   to	   resolve	  conflicts	   between	   charging	   provisions	   and	   GAARs	   by	  reference	   to	   rules	   of	   law.	   Indeed,	   the	   judicial	   history	   of	  GAARs	  is	  largely	  a	  history	  of	  just	  that	  phenomenon.	  Courts	  are	   forever	   thinking	   of	   rules	   to	   resolve	   these	   conflicts.	   A	  good	  example	  is	  the	  so-­‐called	  doctrine	  of	  choice,	  which	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  Australia	  invented	  in	  W.P.	  Keighery	  Pty	  Ltd	  v	  
Federal	   Commissioner	   of	   Taxation.50	   Their	   Honours	  explained	  the	  doctrine	  thus:51	  Whatever	  difficulties	  there	  may	  be	  in	  interpreting	  s.	  260,	  [the	  then	  Australian	  GAAR]	  one	  thing	  at	  least	  is	  clear:	  the	  section	   intends	  only	  to	  protect	  the	  general	  provisions	  of	  the	   Act	   from	   frustration,	   and	   not	   to	   deny	   to	   taxpayers	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Eg,	  Canadian	  Supreme	  Court	  cases	  on	  the	  Canadian	  GAAR	  cannot	  be	  reconciled	   in	  any	  satisfactory	  manner.	  Compare,	   for	  example,	  Canada	  
Trustco	   Mortgage	   Company	   v	   Canada	   2005	   SCC	   54	   with	   Mathew	   v	  
Canada	   2005	   SCC	   55.	   In	   the	   respectful	   view	   of	   the	   author,	   the	  reasoning	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  is	  inconsistent	  between	  the	  two	  cases.	  For	  an	  excellent	  analysis	  of	  the	  cases,	  albeit	  an	  analysis	  the	  is	  more	  charitable	  to	  the	  Court,	  see	  David	  G.	  Duff,	  “The	  Supreme	  Court	  of	   Canada	   and	   the	   General	   Anti-­‐Avoidance	   Rule”	   60	   Bulletin	   of	  
International	  Taxation	  54	  (February	  2006).	  50	  W.P.	  Keighery	  Pty	  Ltd	  v	  Federal	  Commissioner	  of	  Taxation	  [1957]	  100	  CLR	  66	  (HCA,	  FC).	  51	  Id,	  [20]	  86,	  per	  Dixon	  CJ,	  Kitto,	  and	  Fullagar	  JJ.	  McTiernan	  J	  agreed,	  96.	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any	   right	   of	   choice	   between	   alternatives	   which	   the	   Act	  itself	  lays	  open	  to	  them.	  	  On	   its	   face,	   this	   passage	   is	   entirely	   plausible.	   But	   a	  moment’s	   thought	   shows	   that	   if	   the	   doctrine	   of	   choice	   is	  indeed	   a	   rule	   of	   law,	   then,	   at	   least	   in	   principle,	   a	   GAAR	  could	  have	  no	  effect.	  The	  reason	  is	  that	  wherever	  a	  GAAR	  is	  relevant	  to	  a	  transaction	  it	  follows	  that	  there	  must	  be	  at	  least	   two	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   legal	   structure	   of	   the	  transaction	   can	   be	   arranged,	   one	   attracting	   less	   tax	   than	  the	  other.	  This	   situation	   is	   not	   a	  matter	   of	   cause	   and	   effect.	   The	  existence	  of	  a	  GAAR	  is	  not	  caused	  by,	  nor	  does	   it	  cause,	  a	  transaction	  to	  be	  able	  to	  take	  more	  than	  one	  possible	  legal	  form.	  Rather,	  the	  only	  cases	  where	  authorities	  may	  need	  to	  call	  on	  a	  GAAR	  are	  cases	  of	  transactions	  that	  permit	  two	  or	  more	   legal	   forms.	   For	   instance,	   in	   the	   Cridland52	   case,	  discussed	   in	   section	   II	  of	   this	   chapter,	   the	   taxpayer	   could	  have	  earned	  his	  salary	  in	  the	  same	  guise	  as	  everyone	  else,	  or	  he	  could	  have	  (as	  he	  did)	  pretended	  to	  be	  an	  earner	  of	  farming	  income.	  If	  there	  is	  only	  one	  possible	  legal	  form	  for	  a	   transaction	   then	   employing	   that	   form	   cannot	   be	  stigmatised	   as	   tax	   avoidance.	   But	   where	   there	   are	   two	  possible	   forms,	   the	  doctrine	   of	   choice	  would	   say	   that	   the	  taxpayer	   may	   choose	   the	   option	   that	   is	   fiscally	   cheaper	  without	  triggering	  the	  GAAR.	  Broadly	  speaking,	  a	  GAAR	  may	  apply	  if	  (a)	  the	  taxpayer	  chooses	   the	   option	   that	   is	   fiscally	   cheaper	   and	   if	   (b)	   that	  option	   has	   some	   quality	   or	   other	   that	  may	   be	   impugned	  and	  that	  may	  thereby	  attract	  the	  GAAR:	  undue	  complexity,	  artificial	   valuations,	   and	   so	   on.	   In	   short,	   when	   a	   case	   is	  such	   that	   the	   GAAR	   may	   apply	   then	   that	   will	   be	   a	   case	  where	   the	   doctrine	   of	   choice	   potentially	   applies;	   the	  doctrine	   of	   choice	  maps	   onto	   the	   cases	   where	   the	   GAAR	  applies.	  The	  two	  have	  the	  same	  preconditions.	  But	  where	  the	  preconditions	  apply,	  and	  where,	   therefore,	  potentially	  both	   the	  GAAR	  and	   the	  doctrine	  of	  choice	  apply,	   then	   the	  GAAR	   is	   ousted.	   Ex	   hypothesi,	   it	   is	   ousted	   by	   the	   same	  conditions	   that	   are	  necessary	   for	   it	   to	   operate	   at	   all.	   It	   is	  perhaps	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  countries	  with	  mature	  GAARs	  have	   rarely	   seen	   courts	   applying	   the	   doctrine	   of	   choice	  since	   about	   1990.	   Not	   that	   the	   doctrine	   is	   dead:	   in	  what	  looks	   suspiciously	   like	   agency	   capture,	   a	  GAAR	   in	   a	  Draft	  Directive	  for	  a	  Common	  Consolidated	  Corporate	  Tax	  Base	  for	  the	  European	  Community	  (2011)	  made	  the	  doctrine	  of	  choice	  a	  central	  element:	  
Article	  80	  General	  anti-­‐abuse	  rule	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	   Cridland	   v	   Federal	   Commissioner	   of	   Taxation	   (1977)	   140	   CLR	   330	  (HCA).	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Artificial	   transactions	   carried	   out	   for	   the	   main	   [sole]	  purpose	   of	   avoiding	   taxation	   shall	   be	   ignored	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	  calculating	  the	  tax	  base.	  The	   first	   paragraph	   shall	   not	   apply	   to	   genuine	  commercial	   activities	   where	   the	   taxpayer	   is	   able	   to	  choose	  between	  two	  or	  more	  possible	  transactions	  which	  have	   the	   same	   commercial	   result	   but	   which	   produce	  different	  taxable	  amounts.	  It	   seems	   that	   someone	   spotted	   the	  problem,	   and	   in	  2012	  the	   Danish	   Presidency	   proposed	   that	   the	   second	  paragraph	  should	  be	  changed	  to:	  The	   first	   paragraph	   shall	   not	   apply	   to	   genuine	  commercial	   activities	   carried	   out	   for	   valid	   commercial	  reasons.	  The	   preceding	   paragraphs	   of	   this	   chapter	   have	  considered	   the	   doctrine	   of	   choice	   not	   because	   it	   is	  important	   in	   the	   jurisprudence	   of	   GAARs	   (though	   it	   is	  significant	   in	   that	   context)	   but	   in	   order	   to	   illustrate	   by	  example	   that	   one	   cannot	   reconcile	   a	   conflict	   of	   norms	  between	  a	  GAAR	  and	  a	  charging	  provision	  by	  referring	  to	  legal	  norms.	  	  
VIII. Principles	  of	  economic	  substance	  Except	  when	   they	  operate	  what	  may	  be	   called	  a	   “candid”	  GAAR,	   judges	   seldom	   expressly	   articulate	   the	   point,	   but	  being	   unable	   to	   refer	   to	   legal	   rules	   to	   resolve	   cases	   of	  avoidance	  and	  GAARs	  courts	   turn	   instead	   to	  principles	  of	  economic	  substance.	  In	   this	   chapter,	   a	   candid	   GAAR	   means	   a	   GAAR	   that	  explicitly	  directs	  the	  court,	  or	  sometimes	  tax	  inspectors,	  to	  determine	   avoidance	   cases	   by	   reference	   to	   economic	  substance.	  Candid	  GAARs	  may	  be	  compared	  with	  standard	  GAARs,	  which	  generally	  have	  much	  the	  same	  effect	   in	  the	  end,	  but	  which	  are	  framed	  in	  terms	  such	  as,	  for	  example:53	  A	   tax	   avoidance	   arrangement	   is	   void	   as	   against	   the	  Commissioner	  for	  income	  tax	  purposes.	  A	  recent	  candid	  GAAR,	  enacted	  in	  2014,	  is	  Article	  556-­‐1	  of	  the	  Tax	  Code	  of	  Kazakhstan.	  Unusually	  from	  a	  Western	  perspective,	   Article	   556-­‐1	   is	   directed	   to	   tax	   authorities	  rather	  than	  to	  courts	  or	  to	  taxpayers,	  but	  this	  difference	  of	  drafting	   does	   not	   appear	   to	   lead	   to	   any	   substantial	  difference	  in	  effect.	  The	  article	  reads:54	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Income	  Tax	  Act	  2007,	  s	  BG	  1	  (New	  Zealand).	  54	   Translation	   by	  Мария	  Джаембаева,	   Almaty,	   edited	   by	   the	   author;	  “(a)”	  and	  “(b)”	  added	  for	  clarity.	  The	  original	  Russian	  reads:	  При	  выявлении	  в	  ходе	  налогового	  контроля	  случаев	  совершения	  налогоплательщиком	   (налоговым	   агентом)	   или	   группой	  налогоплательщиков	   (налоговых	   агентов)	   действия	  (бездействия),	   сделки,	   хозяйственной	   операции,	   в	   которых	   не	  содержится	   экономический	   смысл,	   повлекших	   уменьшение	  налогового	   обязательства,	   органы	   налоговой	   службы	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Tax	   authorities	   conducting	   taxation	   audits	   shall	   ignore	  any	  act	  or	  failure	  to	  act	  on	  the	  part	  of	  a	  taxpayer	  or	  group	  of	  taxpayers,	  including	  all	  business	  or	  other	  transactions,	  where	   such	   act	   or	   failure	   to	   act	   (a)	   lacks	   economic	  substance	  and	   (b)	  causes	  a	  decrease	   in	   tax	   liability;	  and	  the	   tax	  authorities	  shall	   ignore	  such	  act	  or	   failure	   to	  act	  in	   determining	   the	   liability	   of	   such	   taxpayers.	   For	   the	  purposes	  of	  this	  article	  “taxpayer”	  includes	  “tax	  agent”.	  Probably	  the	  most	   famous	  candid	  GAAR	  is	  §7701(o)	  of	  the	  United	  States	   Internal	  Revenue	  Code,	  which	  Congress	  inserted	   in	  March	  2010.	  The	   core	  provisions	  of	   §7701(o)	  are:	   (o)	  Clarification	  of	  economic	  substance	  doctrine	  (1)	  Application	  of	  doctrine	  In	   the	   case	   of	   any	   transaction	   to	   which	   the	   economic	  substance	  doctrine	   is	   relevant,	   such	   transaction	  shall	  be	  treated	  as	  having	  economic	  substance	  only	  if-­‐	  (A)	   the	   transaction	   changes	   in	   a	  meaningful	  way	   (apart	  from	  Federal	  income	  tax	  effects)	  the	  taxpayer's	  economic	  position,	  and	  (B)	   the	   taxpayer	   has	   a	   substantial	   purpose	   (apart	   from	  Federal	   income	   tax	   effects)	   for	   entering	   into	   such	  transaction.	  ….	  (5)(A)	   The	   term	   “economic	   substance	   doctrine”	   means	  the	  common	  law	  doctrine	  under	  which	  tax	  benefits	  under	  subtitle	  A	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  transaction	  are	  not	  allowable	  if	   the	   transaction	   does	   not	   have	   economic	   substance	   or	  lacks	  a	  business	  purpose.	  This	  chapter	  quotes	  the	  Kazakh	  and	  American	  GAARs	  at	  some	  length	  to	  make	  the	  point	  that	  when	  judges	  are	  faced	  with	   reconciling	   conflicting	   norms,	   being	   charging	   rules	  and	  GAARs,	  they	  have	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  step	  outside	  the	  law	  and	  to	  test	   the	  facts	  of	   the	  case	  according	  to	  principles	  of	  economic	  and	  business	  substance.	  Judgments	   in	   cases	  where	   standard	  GAARs	   are	   in	  play	  are	  much	  less	  explicit,	  but,	  particularly	  in	  jurisdictions	  that	  have	  had	  relatively	  long	  experience	  with	  GAARs,	  one	  often	  finds	   references	   to	   criteria	   of	   economic	   substance.	   For	  instance,	   in	   Federal	   Commissioner	   of	   Taxation	   v	   Purcell	  Knox	  C.J.	   said55	   that	   the	  provisions	  of	   the	   then	  Australian	  GAAR:56	  …	  are	  intended	  to	  and	  do	  extend	  to	  cover	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  transaction	  in	  question,	  if	  recognised	  as	  valid,	  would	  enable	   the	   taxpayer	   to	   avoid	   payment	   of	   income	   tax	   on	  what	  is	  really	  and	  in	  truth	  his	  income.	  By	   these	   words,	   his	   Honour	   meant	   that	   the	   income	   in	  question	   was	   income	   of	   the	   taxpayer	   in	   a	   substantive,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  определяют	  налоговое	  обязательство	  таких	  налогоплательщиков	  (налоговых	   агентов)	   без	   учета	   указанных	   действия,	   сделки,	  хозяйственной	  операции.	  55	  Federal	  Commissioner	  of	  Taxation	  v	  Purcell	  (1921)	  29	  C.L.R.	  464,	  466	  (HCA,	  FC).	  56	   Commonwealth	   of	   Australia	   Income	   Tax	   and	   Social	   Services	  Contribution	  Assessment	  Act	  1936–1951,	  s	  260.	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economic,	  sense,	  even	  though	   legally	  he	  did	  not	  derive	  or	  own	  the	  income	  himself.	  Sometimes	   courts	   illogically	   cling	   to	   the	   illusion	   of	  deciding	  a	  GAAR	  case	  according	  to	  legal	  rules,	  while	  at	  the	  same	   time	   determining	   the	   case	   according	   to	   economic	  substance.	   For	   instance,	   in	   the	   New	   Zealand	   case	   of	   Ben	  
Nevis	  Forestry	  Ventures	  Ltd	  &	  Ors	  v	  Commissioner	  of	  Inland	  
Revenue,57	   discussed	   in	   section	   VI	   of	   this	   chapter,	   the	  Supreme	   Court	   embarked	   on	   a	   “principled	   approach”58	  without	   in	   the	   end	   identifying	   any	   relevant	   principle	   of	  law,	  apart	  from	  that	  of	  giving	  “proper	  effect”59	  to	  relevant	  statutory	  language,	  something	  that	  we	  expect	  of	  a	  court	  as	  a	   matter	   of	   course.	   Ultimately,	   the	   case	   appears	   to	   have	  turned	   on	   questions	   of	   economic	   reality.	   The	   courts	  should:60	  …	   consider	   the	   use	   made	   of	   the	   [charging	   provision	   in	  question]	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   commercial	   reality	   and	   the	  economic	   effect	   of	   that	   use.	   The	   ultimate	   question	   is	  whether	   the	   impugned	   arrangement,	   viewed	   in	   a	  commercially	  and	  economically	  realistic	  way,	  makes	  use	  of	   the	   specific	   provision	   in	   a	   manner	   that	   is	   consistent	  with	  Parliament's	  purpose.	  If	  that	  is	  so,	  the	  arrangement	  will	   not,	   by	   reason	   of	   that	   use,	   be	   a	   tax	   avoidance	  arrangement.	   If	   the	   use	   of	   the	   specific	   provision	   is	  beyond	  Parliamentary	  contemplation,	  its	  use	  in	  that	  way	  will	   result	   in	   the	   arrangement	   being	   a	   tax	   avoidance	  arrangement.	  It	  is	  instructive	  to	  consider	  this	  kind	  of	  argument	  in	  the	  more	  general	  terms	  that	  Kelsen	  employed.	  A	  good	  example	  is	   his	   sub-­‐chapter,	   “Causal	   and	   Normative	   Social	  Science”.61	   What	   happens,	   as	   he	   explains	   there,	   without	  specific	  recognition	  by	  legal	  scientists	  (or	  by	  judges	  in	  the	  passage	   just	  quoted)	   is	   that	  an	  argument	  such	  as	   that	  set	  out	  in	  that	  passage	  moves	  from	  “ought”	  to	  “is”.	  There	  is	  no	  superior	   rule	   in	   the	   hierarchy	   of	   norms	   to	   resolve	   the	  conflict;	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  “ought”	  of	  positive,	  man-­‐made	  norms	   is	  exhausted.	  The	  court	   turns	   instead	  to	   the	  “is”	  of	  the	   science	   of	   economics,	   a	   science	   that	   attempts	   to	  explain	  human	  behaviour	   causally,	   operating	   in	   the	   same	  manner	  as	  natural	  sciences	  and	  other	  social	  sciences.	  This	  invocation	   of	   “is”,	   of	   fact,	   is	   of	   course	   anathema	   to	   the	  fundamental	  thesis	  of	  Kelsen’s	  pure	  theory	  of	  law.62	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	   Ben	   Nevis	   Forestry	   Ventures	   Ltd	   &	   Ors	   v	   Commissioner	   of	   Inland	  
Revenue	  [2008]	  NZSC	  115,	  [2009]	  2	  NZLR	  289	  (SC).	  58	  Id	  [13].	  59	  Id	  [102].	  60	  Id	  [109].	  61	   Kelsen,	  Hans,	   “Causative	   and	  Normative	   Social	   Science”,	   in	  Kelsen,	  Hans,	   Pure	   Theory	   of	   Law,	   Trans	   Max	   Knight	   (1967)	   Berkeley,	   Calif,	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  85	  ff.	  62	   Kelsen,	   Hans,	   Pure	   Theory	   of	   Law,	   Trans	   Max	   Knight	   (1967)	  Berkeley,	  Calif,	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  4–10,	  193,	  and	  passim.	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IX. Principles	  of	  morality	  As	  explained,	  when,	  together,	  the	  need	  to	  resolve	  conflicts	  between	   charging	   rules	   and	  GAARs,	   and	   the	  mandates	   of	  logic,	   require	   a	  departure	   from	   strictly	   legal	   rules,	   courts	  generally	   turn	   to	   economic	   reality,	   but	   occasionally	   they	  resort	   instead	   or	   as	   well	   to	   norms	   of	   morality.	   For	  instance,	   in	   Elmiger	   v	   Commissioner	   of	   Inland	   Revenue63	  Woodhouse	   J	   adopted	   the	   following	   passage	   from	   the	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Court	  case	  of	  Higgins	  v	  Smith:64	  Each	   tax	   according	   to	   a	   legislative	   plan	   raises	   funds	   to	  carry	  on	  government.	  The	  purpose	  here	  is	  to	  tax	  earnings	  and	  profits	   less	  expenses	  and	   losses.	   If	  one	  or	   the	  other	  factor	   in	  any	  calculation	   is	  unreal	   it	  distorts	   the	   liability	  of	   the	  particular	   taxpayer	   to	   the	  detriment	  of	   the	  entire	  tax-­‐paying	  group.	  Occasionally,	  a	  court	  will	  explain	  the	  operation	  of	  a	  GAAR	  in	  terms	  that	  appear	  to	  call	  on	  both	  morality	  and	  economic	  reality	   at	   the	   same	   time.	   Thus,	   in	   Gregory	   v	   Helvering,	  which	   turned	   on	   the	   American	   judge-­‐made	   GAAR,	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  said:65	  The	  whole	   undertaking,	   though	   conducted	   according	   to	  the	   terms	  of	   [a	  particular	  provision	  of	   the	  United	  States	  tax	   code],	  was	   in	   fact	   an	   elaborate	   and	   devious	   form	   of	  conveyance	  masquerading	  as	  a	  corporate	  reorganization,	  and	   nothing	   else.	   The	   rule	   which	   excludes	   from	  consideration	   the	   motive	   of	   tax	   avoidance	   is	   not	  pertinent	   to	   the	   situation,	   because	   the	   transaction	  upon	  its	  face	  lies	  outside	  the	  plain	  intent	  of	  the	  statute.	  To	  hold	  otherwise	  would	  be	  to	  exalt	  artifice	  above	  reality	  and	  to	  deprive	  the	  statutory	  provision	  in	  question	  of	  all	  serious	  purpose.66	  Analytically,	  the	  shift	  from	  law	  to	  morality	  is	  a	  different	  kind	   of	   move	   from	   the	   shift	   from	   law	   to	   criteria	   of	  economic	   substance.	   As	   explained,	   the	   latter	   involves	   a	  move	   from	   law	   to	   fact.	   In	   contrast,	   going	   from	   law	   to	  morality	   is	  a	  shorter	   journey,	   from	  one	  normative	  system	  (law)	  to	  another	  (morals).	  Nevertheless,	  the	  pure	  theory	  of	  law	  sets	  its	  face	  against	  that	  journey	  just	  as	  resolutely	  as	  it	  does	  against	  moving	  from	  law	  to	  fact.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	   Elmiger	   v	   Commissioner	   of	   Inland	   Revenue	   [1966]	   683,	   687	  (Woodhouse	  J),	  affd	  [1967]	  NZLR	  161	  (CA).	  64	  Higgins	  v	  Smith	  (1940)	  308	  U.S.	  473,	  476–477.	  65	  Gregory	  v	  Helvering	  293	  US	  465,	  469–470	  (1935).	  66	   Despite	   such	   observations,	   common	   law	   courts	   are	   adamant	   that	  morality	   has	   no	   place	   in	   judging	   whether	   tax	   avoidance	   has	   taken	  place.	   See,	   for	   example,	   Ben	   Nevis	   Forestry	   Ventures	   Ltd	   &	   Ors	   v	  
Commissioner	  of	  Inland	  Revenue	  [2008]	  NZSC	  115,	  [2009]	  2	  NZLR	  289	  (SC)	  [15]:	  “[The	  judicial	  process	  of	  determining	  whether	  tax	  avoidance	  has	   occurred]	  must	   enable	   decisions	   to	   be	  made	   on	   individual	   cases	  through	  the	  application	  of	  a	  process	  of	  statutory	  construction	  focusing	  objectively	   on	   features	   of	   the	   arrangements	   involved,	   without	   being	  distracted	  by	   intuitive	  subjective	   impressions	  of	  the	  morality	  of	  what	  taxation	  advisers	  have	  set	  up.”	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X. Economic	   substance,	  morality,	   and	   the	   Pure	   Theory	  
of	  Law	  The	  mode	  of	  reasoning	  in	  applying	  GAARs	  described	  in	  the	  previous	   section	   of	   this	   chapter,	   deferring	   to	   criteria	   of	  economic	  substance	  or	  of	  morality,	  is	  wholly	  incompatible	  with	  Kelsen’s	  pure	   theory	  of	   law.67	  Nevertheless,	  when	   it	  comes	   to	   GAARs	   the	   law	   has	   reached	   its	   boundaries.	   In	  order	   to	   resolve	  a	   conflict	  of	  norms	  where	  one	  norm	   is	  a	  GAAR	  courts	  must	  abandon	  the	  hierarchical	  climb	  towards	  the	   Grundnorm68	   and,	   bursting	   the	   bubble	   of	   law,	   must	  turn	   instead	   to	  norms	   that	   are	   outside	   law.	   Practice	   thus	  inevitably	   departs	   from	   Kelsen’s	   theory	   and,	   where	   the	  norm	   is	   tested	   by	   reference	   to	   economic	   substance,	  practice	   departs	   from	  Kelsen’s	   principle,	   “The	   reason	   for	  the	   validity	   of	   a	   norm	   is	   always	   another	   norm,	   never	   a	  fact”.69	  (There	   is	   an	   interesting	  parallel	  with	  Luhman’s	   theory	  of	   autopoiesis,	   which	   posits	   that	   law	   is	   self-­‐creating	   and	  autonomous,	   not	   part	   of	   other	   social	   systems	   and	   barely	  influenced	   by	   them.70	   Like	   Kelsen’s	   pure	   theory	   of	   law,	  Luhman’s	  theory	  of	  autopoiesis	  also	  breaks	  down	  when	  it	  tries	   to	   account	   for	   GAARs,	   and	   breaks	   down	   for	   similar	  reasons.71)	  These	   conclusions	   lead	   to	   several	   reflections.	   	   First,	  although	  it	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  GAARs,	  Kelsen’s	  pure	  theory	  is	  nevertheless	  a	  powerful	  explanatory	  tool,	  a	  tool	  that	  for	  the	  most	  part	  depicts	   the	  nature	  of	   law	  accurately.	  At	   the	  same	  time,	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  pure	  theory	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  GAARs	  contains	  a	  lesson:	  that	  we	  cannot	  expect	  a	  GAAR	  to	  yield	   to	   standard	   legal	   reasoning,	   autonomous	   from	  considerations	   of	   economic	   substance	   and	   even	   of	  morality.	   In	   turn,	   this	   lesson	   shows	   that	   from	   the	  perspective	   of	   Kelsenian	   analysis	   (more	   precisely,	   the	  mirror	   image	   of	   Kelsenian	   analysis)	   fundamental	   theory	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	   Kelsen,	   Hans,	   Pure	   Theory	   of	   Law,	   Trans	   Max	   Knight	   (1967)	  Berkeley,	  Calif,	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  195–278	  and	  passim.	  68	   The	   Grundnorm,	   translated	   in	   Pure	   Theory	   of	   Law	   as	   the	   “basic	  norm”,	   is	  a	  norm	  presumed	  by	  the	  pure	  theory	  of	   law	  as	  the	  ultimate	  authority	  for	  the	  norms	  of	  a	  legal	  system.	  Kelsen,	  Hans,	  Pure	  Theory	  of	  
Law,	  Trans	  Max	  Knight	  (1967)	  Berkeley,	  Calif,	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  4–10,	  193,	  and	  passim.	  69	  Kelsen,	  Hans,	  What	  is	  Justice?	  219.	  See	  also	  Golding,	  M.P.	  “Kelsen	  and	  the	  Concept	  of	  ‘Legal	  System’”	  in	  Summers,	  Robert	  S	  (ed)	  More	  Essays	  in	  Legal	  Philosophy	  (Basil	  Blackwell,	  Oxford	  1971)	  69,	  77.	  70	  See	  generally,	  Geraldine	  Hikaka	  and	  John	  Prebble	  “Autopoiesis	  and	  General	   Anti-­‐Avoidance	   Rules”	   (2010)	   21	   Critical	   Perspectives	   on	  Accounting	   (Symposium	   Issue,	   “Critical	   Perspectives	   on	   Taxation)	  545–559.	  71	  Idem.	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did	  not	  support	  the	  turn	  that	  scholars	  observed72	  in	  United	  States	   avoidance	   jurisprudence	   towards	   formality	   and	  literalism,	   occurring	   from	   approximately	   2001.	   In	  Kelsenian	  terms,	  that	  turn	  seemed	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  pure	  theory	   of	   law,	   but	   it	   was	   mistaken	   to	   do	   so.	   The	   courts	  should	  have	  hewed	  to	  the	  economic	  substance	  approach	  of	  earlier	   years.73	   This	   mistake	   took	   on	   even	   greater	  significance	  in	  2010,	  when	  Congress	  codified	  the	  economic	  substance	  doctrine	  as	  a	  candid	  statutory	  GAAR.74	  Secondly,	  does	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  pure	  theory	  to	  account	  for	  GAARs	  shed	  any	   light	  on	  Kelsen’s	  change	  of	  mind	   late	  in	   his	   career	   on	   the	   principle	   of	   non-­‐contradiction	  when	  applied	   to	   norms?	   The	   following	   section	   addresses	   that	  question.	  
XI. Validity	  of	  conflicting	  norms	  From	   the	   1960s,	   Kelsen	   took	   a	   different	   view	   on	   the	  application	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   non-­‐contradiction	   to	  conflicts	  between	  norms.	  His	  last	  word	  on	  the	  subject	  was	  in	   General	   Theory	   of	   Norms,	   which	   appeared	   in	   1991,	  eighteen	   years	   after	   his	   death.	   In	   that	   book,	   Kelsen	  wrote:75	  As	  far	  as	  conflicts	  between	  general	  norms	  are	  concerned,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case–as	  I	  claimed	  in	  my	  Pure	  Theory	  of	  Law–that	  a	  conflict	  of	  norms	  which	  cannot	  be	  resolved	  by	  the	  principle	  lex	  posterior	  derogate	  legi	  priori	  makes	  no	  sense	  and	   that	   both	   norms	   are	   therefore	   invalid.	   Each	   of	   the	  two	  general	  norms	  makes	  sense	  and	  both	  are	  valid.	  This	   new	   and	   opposite	   approach	   attracted	   criticism.76	  In	   favour	   of	   Kelsen’s	   later	   opinion	   is	   that,	   broadly	  speaking,	  according	  to	   the	  pure	  theory	  of	   law	  the	  validity	  of	  a	  norm	  depends	  not	  on	  its	  content	  but	  on	  whether	  it	  is	  authorised	  by	  a	  norm	   that	   is	   superior	   in	   the	  hierarchy	   to	  which	   it	   belongs.77	   Against	   that	   approach	   is	   the	  consideration	   that	   even	   if	   two	   norms	   are	   properly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  Eg	  Postlewaite,	  Philip,	  “United	  States:	  the	  Judicial	  Sham	  Doctrine”	  in	  Prebble,	  Zoe	  and	  John	  Prebble	  “Comparing	  the	  General	  Anti-­‐Avoidance	  Rule	  of	  Income	  Tax	  Law	  with	  the	  Civil	  Law	  Doctrine	  of	  Abuse	  of	  Law”	  [2008]	  Bulletin	  for	  International	  Taxation,	  151,	  165,	  §9.3	  ff..	  A	  notable	  example	  is	  Compaq	  Computer	  Corp	  v.	  Commissioner	  277	  F.3d	  778	  (5th	  Cir.	  2001),	  discussed	  idem.	  73	  Described	  Postlewaite,	  above	  n	  27.	  74	  See	  above,	  section	  VIII,	  “Principles	  of	  economic	  substance”.	  75	   Kelsen,	  Hans,	  General	   Theory	   of	  Norms,	   Trans	  M.	  Hartney	   (Oxford:	  Oxford	   University	   Press	   1991)	   214,	   discussed	   in	   Duxbury,	   Neil	   “The	  Basic	   Norm:	   and	   Unsolved	   Murder	   Mystery”	   LSE	   Law,	   Society	   and	  Economy	  Working	  Papers	  17/2007,	  sssrn.com/abstract=1033331,	  2.	  76	  Eg,	  Raz,	  J.	  (1976)	  “Critical	  Study:	  Kelsen’s	  General	  Theory	  of	  Norms”,	  Philosophia	  6,	  495.	  77	   Eg,	   Kelsen,	   Hans,	   Pure	   Theory	   of	   Law,	   Trans	   Max	   Knight	   (1967)	  Berkeley,	  Calif,	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  193	  ff.	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authorised,	  together	  they	  make	  no	  sense	  if	  they	  contradict	  each	  other.	  This	  chapter	  is	  not	  the	  place	  to	  resolve	  that	  conflict.	  But	  what	   can	   be	   said	   is	   that	   the	   case	   of	   a	   GAAR	   and	   a	  conflicting	   charging	   provision	   may	   be	   advanced	   as	   an	  example	  of	   two	  norms	  that	  are	  both	  undeniably	  valid	  but	  that	   conflict	  with	  one	  another.	  That	   is,	   the	  norms	  conflict	  with	  one	  another	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   to	   resolve	   the	   conflict	  we	  must	  go	  outside	  the	  law	  and	  resort	  to	  considerations	  of	  economic	  substance	  and	  possibly	  of	  morality,	  as	  explained	  in	   section	   X	   of	   this	   chapter.	   Would	   Kelsen	   have	   taken	  comfort	   from	   this	   example?	   It	   is	   hard	   to	   say.	   Like	   most	  legal	  philosophers	  Kelsen	  gave	  very	   little	   attention	   to	   tax	  law78	  and	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  he	  ever	  turned	  his	  mind	  to,	  or	   even	   heard	   of,	   the	   curiosity	   that	   is	   a	   general	   anti-­‐avoidance	  rule.	  The	  best	   that	  we	  can	  say	   is	   that	  as	  a	   true	  scholar	  Kelsen	  would	  have	  been	  glad	  to	  encounter	  a	   legal	  norm	  of	  a	  kind	  that	  he	  had	  not	  previously	  met.	  But	  would	  his	  pleasure	  have	  been	  alloyed	  when	  he	  appreciated	  that	  it	  is	   in	   the	   core	   nature	   of	   GAARs	   that	   their	   conflict	   with	  charging	  provisions	  of	   taxation	   law	  is	   in	  the	  end	  resolved	  by	   resort	   to	   the	   extra-­‐legal	   principles	   of	   economic	  substance	   and	   even	   of	  morality?79	   From	   this	   perspective,	  one	   is	   almost	   relieved	   on	   Kelsen’s	   behalf	   that	   he	   never	  knowingly	  encountered	  a	  GAAR,	  a	  species	  of	  law	  that	  calls	  into	   question	   two	   fundamental	   foundations	   of	   the	   pure	  theory.	  
XII. Conclusion	  On	   the	   face	  of	   it,	   the	   implications	  of	   these	   considerations	  are	  of	  no	  more	  than	  scholarly	  interest.	  But	  there	  is	  in	  fact	  more.	   These	   implications	   are	   important	   to	   the	   modern	  world.	   The	   author	   has	   argued	   elsewhere	   that	   although	  GAARs	  are	  odd	  as	  a	  form	  of	  law,	  and	  that	  although	  GAARs	  appear	   to	   breach	   a	   number	   of	   the	   requirements	   that	   we	  generally	   insist	   on	   as	   criteria	   of	   good	   law,	   GAARs	   are	   at	  worst	   a	   necessary	   evil,	   necessary	   to	   counteract	   the	  shortcomings	   that	   are	   inherent	   in	   income	   tax	   law.	   The	  modern	   state	   relies	   a	   good	   deal	   on	   income	   tax	   law	   and	  cannot	  afford	   the	   luxury	  of	  permitting	   taxpayers	   to	  avoid	  paying	  their	  share	  by	  exploiting	  income	  tax	  law’s	  inherent	  weaknesses.80	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	   There	   is	   an	   isolated	   example	   of	   Kelsen’s	   thoughts	   on	   taxation	   in	  Hart,	  H.L.A.,	  “Kelsen	  Visited”	  (1963)	  UCLA	  Law	  Review	  709,	  717–722.	  79	  Sections	  VIII	  and	  IX	  above.	  80	  See,	  eg,	  the	  papers	  cited	  above	  at	  note	  5,	  and	  see	  generally	  Prebble,	  John,	  “Ectopia,	  formalism,	  and	  anti-­‐avoidance	  rules	  in	  income	  tax	  law”	  (1994)	   in	   W.	   Krawietz	   N.	   MacCormick	   &	   G.H.	   von	   Wright	   (eds)	  
Prescriptive	   Formality	   and	   Normative	   Rationality	   in	   Modern	   Legal	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